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OPERATIONS OF "T" FORCE, 12TH ARMY GROUP,
IN THE LIBERATION AND INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION
OF PARIS, FRANCE, 25 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER 1944

(NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN)

(Personal Experience of "T" Force Executive Officer)

Type of operation described:

AN INTELLIGENCE ASSAULT FORCE IN THE
INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION OF A CITY.

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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A-2, USSTAF	Air Intelligence U. S. Strategic and Tactical Air Force
ADI (K)	Air Detailed Interrogation Center (Allied)
ALSOS Mission	A War Department secret mission
APWIU, Ninth Air Force	Air Prisoner of War Interrogation Unit, Ninth Air Force
CIPC	Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub Committee .. a high level British-American Intelligence Committee located in London but closely connected with SHAEF
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CIB	Counterintelligence Branch
CP	Command Post
CWS	Chemical Warfare Service
Detachment 19, SIS, EPOUSA	Signal Intelligence Service Detachment
EEISS	Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, Signal, A Signal Tech- nical Intelligence Team
FFI	French Forces of the Interior
FSS	French Special Services
I.S. 9 (WEA)	Escape and Evasion Interroga- tion Team
MII	Military Intelligence Inter- preter Team
M.I.6	A British War Office Intelligence Group
MIS	Military Intelligence Service Headquarters for administration of Intelligence teams
OCE	Office Chief of Engineers

ONI, CIG 125.8	Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Intelligence Group
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OSS/SCI	Office of Strategic Services/ Special Counterintelligence
P&PW	Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SIS, Ninth Air Force	Signal Intelligence Service, Ninth Air Force
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SSM	Military Security Services (French)
2 I (u) Section M.I.6	A British War Office Special Intelligence Section
30 Assault Unit, ANCXF	A British Marine Naval Ground Assault Unit operating under Allied Naval Combined Expedi- tionary Force

OPERATIONS OF "T" FORCE, 12TH ARMY GROUP,
IN THE LIBERATION AND INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION
OF PARIS, FRANCE, 25 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER 1944

(NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN)

(Personal Experience of "T" Force Executive Officer)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of "T" Force, 12th Army Group, in the liberation and intelligence exploitation of PARIS, FRANCE, 25 August - 6 September 1944.

Not until the close of World War II was the secret classification lifted from all matters pertaining to the organization and operation of "T" Force. It is, therefore, considered appropriate to present a brief historical background of facts leading up to the establishment of this particular Force before presenting the general military situation existing in Western Europe, which culminated in the PARIS operation. (1)

Military leaders had foreseen the possibilities connected with seizing and exploiting new ideas of the enemy. These could be found in weapons and equipment, laboratories engaged in military research and with the scientists who were engaged in such research. Unquestionably, there were many embryonic means and devices for improved warfare being planned by our enemies on the drawing boards and in the laboratories. It was felt that if some of these could be converted to our use, it would insure early Allied success and a saving of lives and material. (2)

(1) Personal Knowledge; (2) Personal Knowledge.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEPF) was well aware of these possibilities, the importance of technical intelligence and what could be gained from its proper exploitation in the laboratory stages. (3) The first test of such an exploiting operation on a large scale was in ITALY where a Force known as "S" Force, operating under Fifth Army, participated in the liberation and intelligence exploitation of ROME, ITALY, on 4 June 1944. (4) As a result of this operation, SHAEPF undertook planning for the employment of "T" Forces in the European Theater of Operations. On 27 July 1944, SHAEPF issued Intelligence Directive Number 17, which resulted in the establishment of "T" Forces in the U. S. 6th and 12th Army Groups and the 21st British Army Group. (5)

This directive outlined the overall responsibilities. SHAEPF was to supply full information in the form of "Target Folders" on all equipment and persons to be seized or placed under guard, pending their exploitation or removal. Army Groups were to plan for dealing with these targets, provide necessary personnel to secure and guard the targets, and arrange for disposal of documents, equipment and persons. This was to be in accordance with SHAEPF instructions. All agencies, including specialists and scientists from the United Kingdom and the United States, interested in the search for intelligence from targets within the area of "T" Force operations were to be made subordinate to the "T" Force commander. (6)

(3) Personal Knowledge; (4) A-9, p. 148; Personal Knowledge; (5) A-2, p. 3; A-15; (6) A-2, p. 29; Personal Knowledge.

It was realized that the size and type of personnel of a "T" Force would vary according to the target or the size of the city. It was essential that troops employed on these missions operate separately and independently from troops engaged in combat or occupation duties. (7)

On 2 August 1944, Colonel Francis P. Tompkins, GSC (Cavalry), then Chief of the Intelligence Branch, G-2 Section, 12th Army Group, was designated as the officer responsible for "T" Force matters. Colonel Tompkins had to formulate plans for constituting an Army Group Intelligence-Counterintelligence Assault Force to operate under the technical guidance of the ACoIS, G-2, 12th Army Group. (8)

This Force had to be adequate for any type of future operation. In order to gather background information to aid in his planning, Colonel Tompkins proceeded to Fifth Army in ITALY to confer with the Staff of the "S" Force which had operated in ROME. He returned to 12th Army Group on 15 August, and on that date started to assemble a staff and organize his Force. (9)

The first official orders and instructions issued by the 12th Army Group Commander were by letter dated 20 August 1944 which:

- a. Designated PARIS as the first target city.
- b. Authorized a "T" Force to be comprised of a headquarters and headquarters company, attached troops and attached "Specialists."

(7) A-2, p. 30; (8) A-2, p. 3; Personal Knowledge; (9) A-2, p. 3; Personal Knowledge.

- c. Directed that the Force was to operate under Army Group control, being attached at the proper time to U. S. First Army for administrative support and tactical coordination.
- d. Specified that all "T" Force activities be closely coordinated with U. S. First Army's arrangements for capture and occupation of PARIS.
- e. Formulated the general mission of "T" Force for Operation PARIS which is quoted as follows:
 - "1. To capture designated enemy agents and key collaborators.
 - "2. To seize, safeguard and process documents, archives and material of intelligence or counterintelligence interest.
 - "3. To seize and guard designated military or public installations and utilities of primary importance to the Allied Forces.
 - "4. To contact and coordinate the activities of Allied agents, pro-Allied organizations and persons known to be of possible assistance to the Allied cause.
 - "5. Initially to assist and coordinate the activities of all Allied agencies such as Civil Affairs.
 - "6. To determine when, and in what manner, specific installations and facilities can

be released from "T" Force control.

"7. To accomplish the above and relinquish responsibility to the appropriate Allied authorities as quickly as possible." (10)

GENERAL SITUATION

The German collapse in FRANCE had begun. The Allies in NORMANDY were concentrating their efforts on the encirclement and destruction of the German forces in NORMANDY. The Franco-American forces, which had landed in Southern FRANCE on 15 August, were pushing their way up the valley of the RHONE RIVER from the south. The battle of FALAISE-ARGENTAN had broken the back of the German armies as an effective fighting force, thereby opening the way for the Allied advance across FRANCE and the northern thrust into BELGIUM. (11)

The position of the German forces in PARIS became critical when the Allied forces reached the SEINE RIVER at MELUN above, and MANTES below the city. They were faced not only with encirclement but with a frontal attack by Allied forces at VERSAILLES. (12) (See Annex 1)

On the morning of 21 August, a member of the Resistance Group in PARIS reached 12th Army Group with important information:

a. Within the city the Resistance movement came into the open on 19 August, and joined by the PARIS Police Force, openly defied the Germans by sniping and sabotage.

b. Barricades, in the traditional fashion, were

(10) A-2, p. 32; Personal Knowledge; (11) A-4, p. 49;

(12) A-4, p. 49.

erected throughout the city, further hampering the occupying forces.

c. After considerable fighting, the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) secured control of the center of the city and the bridges leading into PARIS from the west.

d. On 20 August, General von Choltitz, commanding the German forces in PARIS, asked the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) for an armistice to permit the movement of German troops from the western part of PARIS through the city.

e. An armistice was granted which was to expire at noon on 23 August.

f. The FFI (French Forces of the Interior) were badly in need of reinforcements, ammunition and supplies. They feared that the Germans once out of the city might return. (13)

The situation in PARIS was an opportunity which the Allies had to take advantage of immediately. Last minute changes were made in plans of the Allied High Command to permit the liberation of PARIS as soon after the expiration of the armistice on 23 August as possible. (14)

PLAN FOR LIBERATION OF PARIS

General Eisenhower instructed the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, to send a force consisting of French, English and Americans to enter PARIS as soon as possible after the expiration of the armistice. He directed that the French

(13) A-2, p. 34; A-4, p. 49; A-5, p. 22; A-6, p. 198;
(14) Personal Knowledge.

2d Armored Division be brought up from the ARGENTAN sector and be given the honor of liberating the French capitol with the British and Americans. (15)

It was emphasized that PARIS was to be entered only if the degree of fighting could be overcome by light forces. PARIS was not to be taken by violent fighting, bombing or artillery fire if it could be avoided. The advance was to be continued through the city to take over all positions held by the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) and such further advance as could be made without severe fighting in the city itself. When strong resistance was encountered that could not be overcome by light forces, the advancing troops were to stop and assume defensive positions. (16)

The Force to liberate PARIS was to consist of the French 2d Armored Division, an Infantry Division, a Reconnaissance Group, a "T" Force from 12th Army Group and such other detachments considered necessary by the V Corps Commander under whom this Force was to operate. (17)

V CORPS SITUATION AND PLAN OF OPERATION

V Corps had just completed the closing of the enemy pocket at CHAMBOIS, which sector had passed to British control, when it was given the mission of liberating PARIS. U.S. First Army detached the 4th Infantry Division from VII Corps and attached it to V Corps for the operation. The liberating force finally constituted by V Corps contained the French 2d Armored Division, the U. S. 4th Infantry

(15) Personal Knowledge; (16) A-2, p. 34; A-4, p. 49; A-6, p. 198; (17) A-2, p. 34.

Division, 102d Cavalry Group, "T" Force, 12th Army Group, and certain other elements of corps troops. (18)

The mission of this force, given by V Corps at 0001 hours 23 August, was: "...to advance on PARIS by two routes to a Line of Departure running generally from VERSAILLES to PALAISEAU which was not to be crossed prior to 1200 hours 23 August; to take over PARIS from the FFI (French Forces of the Interior), seize the crossings of the SEINE south of the city and establish a bridgehead across the SEINE southeast of PARIS." (19) (See Annex 1.)

"T" FORCE SITUATION AND PLAN OF OPERATION

The "T" Force Commander returned from ITALY on 15 August. He was faced with the task of procuring and equipping a Force and staff adequate to carry out any intelligence exploitation mission that might be assigned. It was realized that a mission might be the exploitation of a single factory or a city as large as PARIS. Starting from scratch and after untold effort, he assembled a staff and a headquarters company. The staff contained an executive officer, an S-2 with two assistants, an S-3 with one assistant, the Headquarters Commandant, who also filled the positions of S-1 and S-4, and three enlisted clerks. The 31st Chemical Decontamination Company was designated "T" Force Headquarters Company. This group now assembled in ST. SAUVEUR was increased by one officer and one warrant officer prior to entry into PARIS. This completed the

(18) A-5, p. 22; A-6, pp. 197-201; (19) A-5, p. 22; A-6, pp. 197-201.

organic "T" Force staff that conducted the PARIS operation with reinforcements from attached personnel. (20)

The Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters 12th Army Group, had been accumulating information since 1 August on personnel and buildings that were to be seized in areas uncovered by the Allies in their advance across FRANCE. SHAEF was supplying a wealth of information obtained from agents operating behind the enemy lines and from many Allied sources. This information after being evaluated and collated was placed in individual target folders with maps, diagrams, charts, descriptions and in many cases, photographs. It was a tedious task that the Counterintelligence Branch worked on day and night. There was a great number of these targets for PARIS. Little did anyone realize that PARIS was to be liberated in a matter of a few days and that these target folders would be required almost overnight. The "T" Force staff never could have coped with this target compilation task at this time, as the organizing and equipping of the Force was a major undertaking. (21)

The Force Commander and his staff planned and put plans into operation at the same time. The Executive Officer carried out the desires of the Commander, wrestled with details and requests for orders, designated individual staff duties and completed all manner of organization details. The S-2 and his assistants procured maps, devised means for handling target folders, worked out details for the composition of target teams, the handling of information, docu-

(20) A-15; (21) A-2, p. 9; Personal Knowledge.

ments and interrogation of prisoners. The S-3 with his assistants worked out problems connected with operations of target teams and combat troops. The Headquarters Commandant secured vehicles for the staff, tentage, equipment and supplies, replacement of the mobile decontaminating tanks and equipment with 2½-ton trucks, and procured other necessary housekeeping items. Many of these items covered the anticipated needs of the headquarters and a large, but unknown, number of intelligence specialists to be attached to the Force, prior to, or after, the opening of a target city. (22)

The planning of this newly constituted staff was successful. An organization with specific functions was set up on paper (See Annex 2). Changes were made in functions and in the organization during the operation but at least the staff had something to work on. (23)

Fifteen target teams were organized covering the 20 political districts of PARIS, known as Arrondissements. Each team was to be composed of a commander, an interpreter (where necessary), A French representative, CIC (Counterintelligence Corps) team personnel, OSS (Office of Strategic Services) personnel and specialists (as necessary), a non-commissioned officer and three or four enlisted men from the Headquarters Company to serve as guards and to protect the teams. (See Annex 3) (24)

Target folders prepared by the Counterintelligence Branch were broken down by Target Team areas and each one

(22) Personal Knowledge; (23) A-15; Personal Knowledge;
(24) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

was given an operational priority. Targets submitted by SHAEF and other headquarters usually carried priorities which were very high and could not necessarily receive the same operational priority from "T" Force. Operational priorities were arrived at by assigning targets in chronological order within an area of operation to include both Personality and Building targets. (25)

"T" Force was given an allotment of troop spaces for the organic staff and the Headquarters Company but no authorization was granted for the extra equipment vitally needed. However, the importance of the establishment of "T" Forces and the urgency required in their activation was such that all required needs were approved by 12th Army Group. All necessary equipment and supplies were assured but it took personal followup and many trips by the "T" Force staff to completely fulfill the organizational needs of the Force. (26)

On 20 August, the 12th Army Group Commander designated PARIS as the first target city and instructed the "T" Force Commander as to the general mission of the Force. The "T" Force Commander considered it advisable to move the Force as soon as possible into an assembly area, on the route to PARIS, where it could shake down and start to function as a self sustaining mobile field force. It was also expected that combat troops and other specialists would join the Force while in the assembly area so that coordinated plans for the expected operation could be worked out. On 20 August, the Commanding Officer dispatched the Headquarters

(25) A-15; Personal Knowledge; (26) Personal Knowledge.

Commandant to select an assembly area in the vicinity of LE MANS. He was to post guides to meet the Force and guide it into the area selected. Most of the organizational details had by this time been completed. Sufficient tentage had been collected to cover the Force and sufficient vehicles were obtained to insure its mobility. The order was therefore given for the Force to leave ST. SAUVEUR the following morning, 21 August, for LE MANS. (27)

On the morning of 21 August, the Force Commander departed early for LE MANS while the Executive Officer assembled the convoy according to prearranged plans. Many last minute arrangements had to be made. In addition to the "T" Force staff and Headquarters Company, there were attached to the Force five officers from the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, 12th Army Group, and several CIC (Counterintelligence) teams. These teams had a total strength of 16 officers and 70 enlisted men. It was not until 1000 hours that the first serial of the convoy, consisting of 46 vehicles, departed for LE MANS. It was soon followed by the second serial consisting of 29 vehicles. The entire convoy closed in the assembly area at 2030 hours that night, 21 August. (28)

It was expected that while in this assembly area all personnel would be indoctrinated in "T" Force technique and that plans would be made for the orderly and systematic exploitation of the target city. However, the rapidity of tactical developments prevented this orderly concentration. Shortly after the arrival of the Force in the assembly area,

(27) A-2, p. 34; A-11; A-15; Personal Knowledge; (28) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

the Commander assembled the staff to disclose a message just received by radio from 12th Army Group. This message ordered the Force to join the French 2d Armored Division in the vicinity of CHATEAUNEUF by 0830 hours the next morning. (29)

CHATEAUNEUF was approximately 67 miles from the "T" Force assembly area so it meant an all night march to reach there at the appointed time the next morning. It was raining hard which added to the difficulty of driving with only blackout lights on the vehicles. The gasoline supply was not adequate for such a march so vehicles were sent out to comb the countryside for a Class III Supply Point. This was a hazardous undertaking on a rainy night without lights in an unfamiliar area, but the quest was eventually successful. After refueling and reloading, the convoy got underway at 0230 hours 22 August, for CHATEAUNEUF. The town was finally reached, at 0820 hours on 22 August, with the loss of three vehicles which were wrecked during the night. (30)

Upon arrival at CHATEAUNEUF, the "T" Force Commander tried to locate the French 2d Armored Division but without success. The situation was extremely obscure but by noon it became apparent from French civilian reports that some elements of the French Division had already proceeded east toward VERSAILLES. In order to carry out its orders to join the French 2d Armored Division, "T" Force moved forward toward VERSAILLES along the route supposedly taken by the French. Fortunately, a halt was made a point east of RAMBOUILLET at 1430 hours. Here it was learned that there

(29) A-11; A-15; Personal Knowledge; (30) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

was a strongly defended enemy road block three or four miles to the front; also that the French Division was in the rear at a point west of RAMBOUILLET. "T" Force not having its combat troops for protection and having been ordered to join the French Division, withdrew to a bivouac area west of RAMBOUILLET while the Force Commander contacted the French Division Commander. (31)

Enemy resistance was being encountered by some of the elements of the V Corps liberating force and it looked as though the Line of Departure would not be crossed at the specified time. The French 2d Armored Division was unable to make the jumpoff for PARIS as originally planned. This resulted in a delay that extended into two days for "T" Force while in the RAMBOUILLET bivouac. This delay was of great value to the Force. It enabled the staff to perfect plans and procedures for the exploitation of the city and to organize the additional representatives of various Allied intelligence agencies who continued to join "T" Force. (32)

During the morning of 25 August, the "T" Force Commander returned from the French Division Headquarters, where he had been watching the tactical situation, with word that one of the southern approaches into PARIS would probably be cleared before the VERSAILLES route. "T" Force was to move at once to a position north of LONGJUMEAU, there to await orders and be prepared to move into PARIS when the route was opened. Word was also received that the long awaited combat troops would not be available to "T" Force until after arrival in PARIS, at which time, one squadron of the

(31) A-11; A-15; Personal Knowledge; (32) A-11; A-15; Personal Knowledge.

102d Cavalry Group would be attached. The "T" Force Commander joined the French Division for the move toward PARIS. When the route was opened he was to send a guide back to meet the "T" Force convoy on the route to PARIS just north of LONGJUMEAU to guide it into the city. (33)

At 1300 hours, 25 August, the Force moved out of its bivouac with LONGJUMEAU its destination. Prior to arrival, the Executive Officer left the convoy to look for a suitable halting point with cover and concealment, where the convoy could be pulled off the road but yet remain in column for the rapid march into PARIS. A chateau about three miles north of LONGJUMEAU was selected as it provided a semicircular drive long enough to take the entire convoy. After locating this position the Executive Officer returned to the convoy. Guides were posted along the highway north of the city to apprehend and escort the "T" Force Commander's guide to the halt position. (34) (See Annex 4)

The convoy was proceeding along a country road toward the selected position when an American liaison plane, flying overhead, was fired on by enemy artillery. This artillery was apparently located over the brow of a hill close to the road on which the convoy was moving. Excited Frenchmen advised the convoy commander that approximately 1500 Germans with considerable artillery were only a few hundred yards from the Force route of march. The Executive Officer dispatched the S-2 to contact American troops who were not far from the location, to appraise them of the enemy location and to seek combat support. It was felt that this support

(33) Personal Knowledge; (34) Personal Knowledge.

was needed to protect the convoy composed of such a large number of intelligence specialists. These specialists were highly trained in their respective fields and, in case of loss, could not be easily replaced. However, no support was available due to the Division's own commitments. In the meantime, the convoy, which had not halted, moved into the selected position at 1700 hours. All personnel were alerted and a series of outguards were posted for the security of the Force. It was expected that the guide would arrive at any minute, inasmuch as unofficial reports indicated that PARIS had been entered that morning. (35)

Drivers of all vehicles were cautioned that they must keep close to the vehicle in front and not lose it for a second. It was expected that the march into PARIS would probably be made at night, by devious routes, and any driver losing sight of the vehicle in front of him would never regain the column. Furthermore, every driver had his weapon ready for immediate use, in case the Germans in the area had detected the convoy and decided to attack. (36)

A French contingent had joined "T" Force at the RAMBOUILLET assembly area. It consisted of 32 officers and 39 enlisted men, transported in 7 jeeps, mounting machine guns, and 13 civilian cars and trucks in all stages of disrepair. The handling of this group was a problem. Many of the group were from PARIS and had not seen their families since the German occupation. The rumors picked up along the route of march were disconcerting to these men and there was talk of leaving the convoy and departing for PARIS at once. The

(35) Personal Knowledge; (36) Personal Knowledge.

"T" Force Executive Officer made it clear to the French leader of the group that they were under "T" Force Command and they would not be permitted to leave the convoy or enter PARIS on their own. Another cautioning influence on the French was their dependence on "T" Force for Class I and III supplies. (37)

At 1900 hours, the guide sent by the "T" Force Commander joined the convoy at its halt position with word that PARIS had been entered at 0700 hours by the French 2d Armored Division, soon followed by American forces. The "T" Force Commander with a small party entered the city at about 1600 hours. He had determined that the proposed CP (Command Post) in the area of the Grand Palais and Petit Palais, on the Avenue Champs Elysees, would provide a satisfactory headquarters and bivouac. These buildings had been selected in advance, from map reconnaissance, as being centrally located and large enough to accommodate the entire Force. The guide had a route to follow that bypassed the many German strong points that had been avoided by the attacking troops when they entered the city. (38)

The first obstacle to overcome was to bypass the group of Germans in the area. Nothing had been heard from them since the liaison plane had been fired on. The route into PARIS was going to be hard to follow and there were not many hours of daylight left when the convoy took off on the last lap of its advance into the target city. It proceeded from the halt area along the same route it had used coming in, but at a rapid rate of speed, until it reached the main

(37) Personal Knowledge; (38) Personal Knowledge; A-15.

highway to PARIS. Not a shot had been fired and not a single German was encountered. (39)

"T" FORCE ENTRY INTO PARIS

The march into PARIS was hazardous. Prior to darkness, the roads were lined with French civilians, cheering, extending glasses and bottles of wine, tossing apples, tomatoes and all manner of tokens of their gratification at being liberated from the Germans. A vehicle, if forced to stop, was soon overrun by this wild, cheering mob. Subsequent to darkness the movement was slow and cautious for German points of resistance were more in evidence in the suburbs of PARIS and these had to be bypassed with care. Road blocks had only small openings in many cases with ditches that had to be crossed. This meant careful maneuvering by the convoy vehicles. The danger of getting lost was ever present. The guide on several occasions outran the column and he had to return to pick it up as the Executive Officer refused to permit a speed greater than all elements could maintain. Frequent halts were made, by means of prearranged signals, to permit the closeup of vehicles and to insure that all were present. Several of the French civilian vehicles broke down and were abandoned. The French were not happy with the convoy commander's decision to abandon these vehicles instead of towing them or stopping the convoy long enough to make repairs. In some instances, they left their own personnel with these vehicles. (40)

(39) Personal Knowledge; A-15; (40) Personal Knowledge.

The responsibility of insuring that the intelligence specialists were safely transported to the target, so that they could successfully carry out their assigned missions, was one that made the convoy commander use every precaution to make sure the convoy reached its destination without harm. It is questionable whether the chances taken, without combat troops to protect the Force, were justified. However, in this case, the march was completed without mishap. The convoy finally arrived at its destination, the Grand Palais and Petit Palais area on the Avenue Champs Elysees at 2200 hours 25 August, without the loss of a single vehicle, except the French civilian cars. (41) (See Annex 4)

OPERATIONS

(Period 2200 hours 25 August - 2400 hours 26 August)

Target Teams had been organized, briefed, and were furnished with necessary target information in target folders at the "T" Force assembly area preceding the entry into PARIS. Each team had a town plan of the city with the arrondissement (s) where the team was to operate and the location of each of the Personality and Building targets plotted thereon. (42)

Target folders contained detailed information on each of these plotted targets. Some important target data was delivered to "T" Force just before the convoy moved out of the assembly area. The material received at this late hour was not plotted on the town plans used by the Target Team

(41) Personal Knowledge; (42) Personal Knowledge.

Commanders. The target folders were given to them insofar as it was possible to do so at that time. In many cases though, this was done during the reorganization upon arrival at the CP. The first Target Team left the CP at 0030 hours 26 August with sufficient transportation to keep the team mobile and to evacuate documents and prisoners to the Force Headquarters. The delay in dispatch of Target Teams was due to the inability to move Teams in their own vehicles as part of the convoy. Their dispatch could have been expedited if they could have proceeded to assigned targets direct from the march column upon its arrival in PARIS. (43)

This first night 25-26 August, only arrondissements I through VII were attacked by the five Target Teams assigned to these areas. (See Annex 5) The status of enemy resistance in the other districts of the city was unknown and dispatch of further teams was dependent on a careful reconnaissance. Targets were attacked in order of operational priority as rapidly as possible. Guards were placed on Building targets and no attempt was made to evacuate or study the documents. Personality targets were difficult to locate but all teams were successful in locating a few this first night. After attacking a few targets, it was realized by some Target Team Commanders that the local Police Station would be a good source of information and would also serve as an excellent Team Command Post. Communication could be maintained with the Force Headquarters in the Petit Palais from these Police Stations as the telephone system in PARIS was intact and operating. (44)

(43) Personal Knowledge; (44) Personal Knowledge.

It was not long before calls began to come in to the Petit Palais with reports on Team locations and reports on the status of targets. The Police had many leads on collaborators and Gestapo agents and with their assistance, the Teams were able to round up many suspects who were sent by truck back to the Force Headquarters for interrogation. When these suspects arrived at the Petit Palais, they were placed under guard in a large courtyard in the center of the building. The Civilian Detention Center personnel went to work immediately on these prisoners to determine what intelligence value, if any, they possessed. If they were of no apparent value and were not listed as a Personality target they were released as soon as possible. (45)

Concurrently with the operation of the Target Teams, the Headquarters "T" Force staff was engaged in working out last minute procedures for conducting the operation in accordance with previous plans. The organic staff was reinforced by personnel from the Headquarters Company and attached intelligence agencies according to the Force Functional Chart. The Petit Palais contained an office arrangement that was quickly adapted to the use of "T" Force Staff Sections. The Signal Officer commanding the EEISS (Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, Signal) team was designated as Force Signal Officer and put to work securing telephone communications for each of the staff sections. He also assisted the OSS/SCI (Office of Strategic Services, Special Counterintelligence) personnel in establishing. (45) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

lishing their radio station. This was the only radio communication available to the Force and through it, contact was maintained with 12th Army Group and intelligence agencies in LONDON. (46)

Target Inspection Reports were not received in any great quantity at the beginning of the operation. Those received, whether verbal over the telephone or written and sent in by vehicles bringing prisoners, were delivered direct to the S-3 Operations Section. This section determined the adequacy of the report and classified it as to status. This status was indicated by one of the following classifications:

a. Completed - (This was a target attacked where the mission was accomplished. Equipment, documents, or personalities were obtained.)

b. Abandoned - (Target attacked but it was of no value because of evacuation or destruction; target assigned on erroneous information and thereby did not properly constitute a target; or with a Personality target, no trace of individual by target name or alias could be found to exist.)

c. Suspended - (No information on a Personality target could be secured although traces of the individual were found. Target is held pending discovery of further information that may be revealed in investigation of other targets. Building targets were suspended when the assigned mission was to seize and guard, when French forces were

(46) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

found in control of the target and there was no present need for American guards.)

d. Pending - (Target attacked but further action was necessary to complete the mission. Action was being continued by the Target Teams or attached specialists.) (47)

The Target Inspection Reports after being classified as to status by the S-3 Operations Section were passed to the S-2 Target Section for recording and then to the S-2 Information Section for posting on the operational map of PARIS. This map had plotted on it, all the "T" Force targets and as a Target Inspection Report was received the status of the target was entered on the map. The staff and intelligence specialists who were not out on Target Teams, frequently referred to this map as it gave a fairly good picture of how fast the operation was progressing. (48)

By daybreak 26 August, the Reception Center was besieged by numerous Frenchmen, and Americans who had resided in PARIS during the German occupation. They had to see the American forces to seek information regarding friends, request gasoline and food and to turn in the names of informers. Before the day was over, hundreds of people had been questioned or had been turned away by the Reception Center. In many instances, valuable leads on subversive characters were obtained. These leads were turned over to the S-2 Target Section for preparation of target folders and eventual transmittal to a Target Team for apprehension of the suspect. (49)

The Headquarters Commandant did not lose any time in

(47) A-15; Personal Knowledge; (48) Personal Knowledge;
(49) Personal Knowledge.

establishing a motor park on the grounds of the Petit Palais, an officers' mess in a small restaurant adjoining the Petit Palais and an enlisted men's mess in the Grand Palais. The crowd of gay, sightseeing, inquisitive Frenchmen became so large that barbed wire had to be placed around the motor park and guards had to be reinforced on all buildings housing "T" Force installations to prevent destruction of property and to permit the Force personnel to carry out their assigned duties. (50)

Combat troops joined the Force during the morning. They consisted of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 30th Bomb Disposal Squad. One troop of the Reconnaissance Squadron was given the immediate job of guarding the headquarters and its adjoining installations thereby relieving members of the Headquarters Company who were badly needed to reinforce Target Teams. Armored vehicles were placed at the corners of the Petit Palais and Grand Palais in positions affording good fields of fire down each side street and over the motor park. The remainder of the Squadron was made available to the S-3 to use for reconnaissance and to augment the Target Teams in taking targets that did not require trained intelligence personnel. The 30th Bomb Disposal Squad was sent out at once to cover the numerous requests the headquarters had received during the morning from Target Teams for the removal of mines, to check on booby traps and to open safes. (51)

During the day, "T" Force attachments were increased to the extent that the total Force now numbered 1814 men.

(50) Personal Knowledge; (51) Personal Knowledge.

17
1-3
This included 310 officers, one warrant officer, 1402 enlisted men and 101 civilians. There were 28 different intelligence gathering agencies represented in these attachments, some of which were on the very highest of secret missions. (52) (See Annex 6)

An attached officer from CIPC (the Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub Committee), SHAEF, with his permission, was selected as Liaison Officer with Attached Intelligence Agencies. He looked after the welfare, transportation and other needs of the visiting intelligence specialists and briefed them as to their responsibilities and functions. Fortunately this job had been foreseen, for some specialists were arriving without prior briefing, thereby not knowing their mission and what they were supposed to do. Furthermore, they were not reluctant to constantly query the staff on minor details at a time when the staff was extremely busy. The Liaison Officer kept the officer in charge of the S-3 Organization Section informed of the specialists arriving in order that they could be organized into Special Target Teams to investigate targets of particular interest to their respective agencies. These Special Teams were briefed, dispatched with guards, interpreters and the necessary transportation to complete their mission. They were required to submit Target Inspection Reports in the same manner as the fifteen regular Target Teams. (53)

Serious problems were encountered before nightfall, by the Headquarters Commandant. The number of transients

(52) Personal Knowledge; (53) A-2; A-15; Personal Knowledge.

appearing at the officers' and the enlisted men's messes had increased during the noon and evening meals to the extent that the facilities were not capable of accommodating them. To stop this, mess passes were prepared during the night and were issued to only those persons authorized "T" Force messing privileges. The securing of Class I and III supplies was another problem that had constantly faced "T" Force, but it had now become critical. The FFI (French Forces of the Interior) and transient U. S. military personnel were making constant demands on "T" Force for gasoline. The consumption of gasoline by the Force was considerable due to the large number of vehicles attached and the constant operation of these vehicles. During the first day, "T" Force supply vehicles were sent to an Army Class III Supply Point located about 200 miles from PARIS. (54)

On the afternoon of 26 August, while an unauthorized French parade, with the French 2d Armored Division participating, was marching down the Avenue Champs Elysees, German snipers opened fire on the crowded Avenue in the vicinity of "T" Force Headquarters, causing numerous casualties to civilian spectators. Immediate hysteria gripped the crowd turning it into a mob seeking self-protection. Civilians hid behind vehicles and hedges in piles two and three bodies deep. Many forced themselves into the headquarters where a partial withdrawal of the Reception Center staff was made to permit this influx, that would otherwise have broken down the doors and windows. The FFI (French Forces of the Interior) were racing madly around the area

(54) Personal Knowledge.

waving firearms and firing at anything, in or on a building, that moved. The Grand Palais which was occupied by the Headquarters Company drew a lot of fire, as it was claimed that snipers were seen firing from its dome. However, a careful search of the building by headquarters troops failed to locate any unauthorized persons. An armored vehicle of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on guard at one corner of the Petit Palais opened fire at a window in the building, with a 50-caliber machine gun, setting fire to the drapes at the window. The commander of this vehicle was relieved on the spot for permitting one of his weapons to fire into the command post. The man who fired the weapon claimed to have seen a gun barrel pushed out from behind the curtains and without waiting for orders, he opened fire. This, of course, caused considerable consternation in the headquarters even though the fire was extinguished with little damage done. The "T" Force dispensary treated six gunfire casualties of which three were "T" Force personnel. In the meantime, the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) were running wild in local street fights against known and suspected collaborationists and a few diehard Germans. Several alleged snipers were gathered up in the Champs Elysees area. (55)

German bombers came over the city after dark and dropped several bombs in an attempt to destroy the SEINE bridges and delay the Allied advance. No damage was done to the bridges or other military objectives. This same night, a sniper fired at some of the "T" Force staff as they entered

(55) A-6; Personal Knowledge.

the Elysees Park Hotel where they were billeted. The only damage was the breaking of the front windows in the hotel.

(56)

After the excitement of the day, climaxed by the bombing of the evening, had worn off, the staff was called together to sort out the confusion of the previous twenty four hours. It was found that not all of the five Target Teams which had been dispatched had established command posts, and many had failed to attack what was considered a satisfactory number of targets. Many Target Inspection Reports were incomplete and the status of the S-2 Information Section Operations map was far from accurate and up to date. The original plan for the handling of documents was to seal the building containing the documents by posting "Entrance Forbidden" signs and stationing guards at all entries. Entry was to be permitted only to authorized "T" Force personnel carrying a "T" Force pass. It was now obvious that sufficient personnel were not available for guarding such premises and some other arrangements had to be worked out. It was apparent that the operation was getting ahead of the staff organization and now that the smoke had lifted, many changes were in order. It was decided that the following changes and new procedures should be carried out immediately or first thing the following morning:

a. A courier service between the Force headquarters and Target Team command posts was to be established at once on a three visit a day schedule. This would supplement the telephone system and simplify the transmission of class-

(56) A-6; Personal Knowledge.

ified reports and instructions.

b. Each Target Team, except the two headquarters teams, must have a command post where a team representative could be located at all times.

c. More care must be used in filling out Target Inspection Reports. In the case of Building targets, they must give the condition of the building and its facilities, contents of the building, whether any occupants of intelligence interest were present, whether or not guards were needed and the action taken by the Target Team. Personality targets must be reported as captured, or if unlocated, all information regarding the target with names of persons who might be able to provide information, must be secured and reported.

d. An S-2/S-3 Operations Room must be established where closely allied functions of the S-2 Target Section and S-3 Operations Section could be consolidated.

e. All Intelligence specialists must check in with the S-2/S-3 Operations Room daily to determine the status of targets in which they were interested and to secure new targets.

f. Daily statistical reports were to be prepared to keep the staff and attached intelligence specialists advised of the progress of the operation.

g. Documents were to be brought to the S-2 Documents Section in the Petit Palais by the Target Teams, where they would be catalogued and filed for ready reference of intelligence specialists.

h. The Civilian Detention Center must be moved to another location where it could operate with some degree of secrecy.

i. All requests for Class I and III supplies made by other than "T" Force authorized units must be approved by the Executive Officer.

j. All Target Teams must submit a daily Supply Report, including such items as number of men on team, rations on hand, rations required for succeeding 24 hour period, oil needed, miscellaneous supplies needed (forms, stationery, etc.)

k. All Team Commanders or their representatives must call at the Force headquarters at least once daily for a briefing regarding new targets, discrepancies in reports submitted, and changes in assigned targets. (57)

OPERATIONS

(Period 2400 hours 26 August - 2400 hours 27 August)

The changes decided upon at the staff meeting held on the night of 26-27 August, which were not completed that night, were put into operation the following morning and all personnel were advised accordingly. During the course of the day, all Target Teams established their command posts, which for the most part, were in the local Police Stations. The courier service was operating effectively. The Civilian Detention Center was moved to 19 Avenue Foch, where it was ideally located completely surrounded by a high wall.

(57) Personal Knowledge.

In view of the large number of prisoners of both sexes being detained, daily inspections of the Detention Center by headquarters officers, were ordered by the Force Commander. A roster was prepared by the Executive Officer covering these inspections which were to be made during the morning and night. They were to be complete inspections covering cleanliness, guard discipline, treatment of prisoners, etc. An order was also issued that at least two officers would be on duty at the Center 24 hours a day, one of whom must be an American, and one French. (58)

The remainder of the fifteen Target Teams were dispatched to take the targets assigned in the arrondissements not previously covered. The two headquarters teams which had been held in reserve were sent out by the S-3 Operations Section to exploit urgent targets brought to the attention of the Force by informants questioned by Reception Center personnel. (59)

Numerous requests were submitted direct to the Executive Officer for Class I and III supplies. Some were approved where circumstances justified that action, but most of them were disapproved. Several of the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) units, who were turned down on their requests, showed considerable resentment, as they could not understand why they were not entitled to anything they wanted. (60)

During the operational period 2200 hours 25 August to 1800 hours 27 August, "T" Force Target Teams attacked 74 Building targets and 82 Personality targets. Of these tar-

(58) Personal Knowledge; (59) Personal Knowledge; (60) Personal Knowledge.

gets attacked the following dispositions were made:

<u>STATUS</u>	<u>BUILDING TARGETS</u>	<u>PERSONALITY TARGETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Completed	5	* 11	16
b. Abandoned	28	11	39
c. Suspended	4	26	30
d. Pending	<u>37</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>71</u>
TOTAL ATTACKED	74	82	156

* A total of 59 individuals were arrested, of whom 11 were target individuals carried in the list of 514 Personality targets originally assigned. There were approximately 500 prisoners of war captured who were not treated as Personality targets and therefore, not included in target figures. (61)

OPERATIONS

(Period 2400 hours 27 August - 1000 hours 6 September)

Target Teams continued to attack targets and to follow up leads on pending targets. The number of prisoners in the Civilian Detention Center continued to grow. Many civilians who were suspected of having knowledge of the activities of a Personality target or who were denounced as informers, were detained and interrogated. In all cases, the decision of the Team Commander was sufficient for the arrest and detention of the suspect at the Detention Center. Documents collected became an insurmountable pile. Personnel trained in handling captured documents were badly needed by the Target Teams and the Documents Section. Many documents were released to intelligence specialists after being cleared by (61) A-13; A-15; Personal Knowledge.

the S-2 and approved by the Executive Officer. (62)

In addition to the targets within the city of PARIS, there were many located in the immediate suburbs. These targets were of three types. The first type were public utilities, electric power plants, waterworks and gas producing plants. CIPC (Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub Committee) targets -(laboratories, research bureaus and testing stations)- composed the second type. They were frequently of very high priority. The third type were regular counterintelligence targets. Those were not included as "T" Force targets, but were turned over to the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone when "T" Force closed the PARIS operation. Due to the limited personnel of "T" Force, the second types were not attacked before the arrival of the CIPC (Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub Committee) experts. As fast as these experts arrived, or as soon thereafter as possible, they were formed into teams with interpreters and other personnel considered necessary to attack individual targets. The first type of targets was developed in personal conference with the Force Commander and the heads of the PARIS utility companies who were afraid of sabotage to these vital installations. All of the gas, light and water plants of primary importance were found in the immediate suburbs, while within the city the most important public utilities were the PTT (Postal, Telegraph and Telephone) installations. These utility targets were attacked by teams composed of personnel from the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

(62) Personal Knowledge.

Guards were placed on the targets which were considered the most vulnerable to possible sabotage. If the plant was well organized under loyal civilian employees, "T" Force guards were not usually employed. Since enemy action within the city continued for 36 to 48 hours after the entry of "T" Force, and sniping for two or three days after that, the Squadron was also used during this period for reconnaissance and security where resistance was reported to be likely. The City of PARIS is honeycombed with underground tunnels and passageways from which many groups of Germans were still being flushed by elements of the Reconnaissance Squadron. (63)

Many of the Building targets had been given a low operational priority to enable the teams to hit Personality targets first. Teams attacking Building targets, during this period, found many of them occupied by French or American Forces. In such cases, the majority of the documents and equipment originally contained in the building were lost or destroyed and the target was a complete loss. (64)

During the operational period 1800 hours 27 August to 1000 hours 6 September, "T" Force Target Teams attacked 308 Building targets, and 432 Personality targets. Of these targets attacked, the following dispositions were made: (65)

<u>STATUS</u>	<u>BUILDING TARGETS</u>	<u>PERSONALITY TARGETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Completed	148	79	227
b. Abandoned	91	69	160
c. Suspended	51	194	245
d. Pending	<u>18</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>108</u>
TOTAL ATTACKED	308	432	740

(63) Personal Knowledge; (64) A-13; A-15; Personal Knowledge;
 (65) A-13; A-15; Personal Knowledge.

On 29 August, the 30th Bomb Disposal Squad was loaned to Seine Base Section as "T" Force had few targets remaining that had not been checked for mines and booby traps. On 30 August, a Military Police Battalion was assigned to Seine Base Section. This permitted the piecemeal release of Building targets to Seine Base Section for guarding, thereby releasing "T" Force guards. This was particularly true in the case of Civil Affairs targets. In all cases where a Building target was pending, it was not released without some bonafide agency assuming the responsibility for its safekeeping and further intelligence exploitation. The S-3 assisted in coordinating the arrangements made for disposal of the large number of Building targets to Seine Base Section, Civil Affairs, local French administration and other interested agencies. The rapid release of targets made it possible to release the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron with the exception of one troop, to V Corps on 1 September. The remaining troop was to be held for 48 hours which was the time anticipated as necessary to release targets in the suburbs of PARIS then being guarded by this troop. (66)

CLOSING THE OPERATION

To facilitate a smooth turnover and to insure continuity of operations, arrangements were made, prior to "T" Force closing the operation, with the Commanding General, Seine Base Section, PARIS, to guard on call, specific in-

(66) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

stallations. Also arrangements had been made with the ACoFS, G-2, Communications Zone, PARIS, whereby some of his key personnel would join "T" Force, just prior to closing the operation, to become familiar with "T" Force operations and problems. These arrangements were successfully carried out prior to 6 September when the turnover was made. (67)

Documents contained in the Documents Section were turned over to the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Communications Zone on 6 September and were moved to 72 Avenue Foch where they were placed in custody of a SHAEF Documents Section. On this same date, the remaining active Building targets were released to local authorities as fast as "T" Force guards were relieved by agencies who had agreed to assume responsibility. (68)

FINAL STATISTICS ON THE PARIS OPERATION

1. Targets Assigned and Attacked:

	<u>BUILDING</u>	<u>PERSONALITY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Targets Assigned	382	514	896
b. Targets Attacked	382	514	896

2. Status of Targets When Turned Over to the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone:

	<u>BUILDING TARGETS</u>	<u>PERSONALITY TARGETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Completed	153	90	243
b. Abandoned	119	80	199
c. Suspended	55	220	275

(67) Personal Knowledge; (68) Personal Knowledge

2. Status of Targets Turned Over to Counterintelligence
(continued)

	<u>BUILDING TARGETS</u>	<u>PERSONALITY TARGETS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
d. Pending	<u>55</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>179</u>
TOTAL ATTACKED	382	514	896

3. Civilian Detention Center:

a. Summary of Persons Interned:

(1) Total Persons interned	243
(2) Personality Targets Included in Total	62
(3) Dispositions (See b, below)	129
(4) Cases Pending	114

b. Dispositions

(1) Released	46
(2) Transferred to PW enclosure	20
(3) Transferred to French Authorities	44
(4) Evacuated to United Kingdom	8
(5) Released to Custody of Civil Affairs	3
(6) Released to French for Military Service	1
(7) Released to Office of Strategic Services, Special Counter- intelligence	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	129 (69)

A complete report of all targets assigned to "T" Force indicating action taken on all 896 targets and status at time of turnover was given to the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone, when the oper-

(69) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

ation was closed on 6 September. At 1000 hours 6 September, "T" Force left PARIS enroute to its next target, after having turned over its remaining responsibilities in PARIS to the Seine Base Section and to G-2 personnel from the Communications Zone. A small staff from "T" Force remained in PARIS for a few days to assist the Communications Zone personnel in the assumption of their new responsibilities. The officer who had acted as liaison officer with attached Intelligence Agencies remained in the city, under Communications Zone control, to coordinate and assist the representatives of CIPC (Combined Intelligence Priorities Sub Committee) whose exploitation of intelligence targets was not complete. (70)

RESULTS OF OPERATION PARIS

Intelligence cannot be measured in dollars and cents, in the number of prisoners in the detention centers, or by any one of the standards that normally denote victory or the successful completion of a mission. Let it suffice to say, that the "T" Force operation could be classified as successful if just one scientist was apprehended who was instrumental in helping U. S. scientists perfect weapons to shorten the war in Europe and the Pacific. It could also be classified as successful if just one instrument of war being perfected in the laboratories of our enemies was denied to them. (71)

It must be recognized, however, that "T" Force itself, was only the instrument for seizing, safeguarding and pro-

(70) A-15; Personal Knowledge; (71) Personal Knowledge.

cessing material of intelligence or counterintelligence value and that the actual exploitation, for whatever intelligence was available, was the mission of the attached intelligence agencies. Consequently, "T" Force fulfilled its mission when it delivered a target to the specialists and safeguarded the specialists during their exploitation. The results of this exploitation were secondary to "T" Force operations and as such, "T" Force was seldom aware of what gems of intelligence were uncovered. (72)

Evidence of success of the "T" Force mission could be based on the following, which are examples of information and material seized and exploited during the operation:

1. Ninety Personality targets out of 514 were considered completed (Documents or personalities desired in connection therewith were obtained).

2. One hundred fifty three Building targets out of 382 were considered completed (Equipment, documents or personalities desired in connection therewith were obtained).

3. Four new types of radio intercept receivers were captured together with information confirming previous reports on new types of signal equipment.

4. A prisoner was captured with keys for an exceedingly high grade cipher system and information as to its operation. Difficulty was experienced at first in securing air transportation but it was finally obtained and he was evacuated to the United Kingdom within 24 hours.

5. A German agent, Maurice Cartier, alias Carrier,

(72) Personal Knowledge.

alias Chabrel, and his mistress, Jeannine Hartman, were apprehended, interrogated and delivered to the French Intelligence Service.

6. A rare set of maps of Indo China, scale 1:100,000, not previously available, was discovered.

7. Recent German intelligence studies on Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland and England were captured.

8. German maps and intelligence studies of Western Russia, formerly unavailable to the Allies in comparable material, were found.

9. A German map, disclosing the plan of mining, demolitions and booby trapping of DUNKIRK, was discovered and sent to Headquarters 21 Army Group (BR) prior to the capture of that city.

10. Two new types of direction finding equipment were discovered.

11. German and French signal equipment sufficient to equip at least two divisions was uncovered.

12. Numerous new type weapons, equipment and materiel, of interest to the Navy, Army and Air Corps, were examined or sent to the United Kingdom or the United States for detailed study.

13. A great quantity of maps covering Eastern France were located. As a sufficient stock of such maps was not available and was urgently needed by Allied troops, this discovery proved to be of great importance and made it possible to supply operational units with such maps long before Allied map supplies could have reached them.

14. The Office of Strategic Services, Special Counterintelligence detachment, succeeded in obtaining a large volume of important counterespionage material in documents seized in various headquarters of the German secret services.

15. Several German agents and informers were apprehended by the Office of Strategic Services, Special Counterintelligence detachment.

16. A number of important members of the German secret services who were picked up furnished valuable information for future operations against the Germans. More than one of these individuals was later employed by the Office of Strategic Services, Special Counterintelligence detachment in penetration or deception capacities. (73)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

"T" Force was organized hastily and to a great extent while on the march, concurrent with the preparation of detailed operational plans. This probably could not have been avoided for this first operation, inasmuch as SHAEF had first directed the establishment of "T" Forces on 27 July 1944. Subsequent to this date, a 12th Army Group Force was organized starting from nothing until it reached the successful operating Assault Force that entered PARIS on 25 August 1944. Furthermore, the fast moving tactical situation and the early opening of PARIS was not anticipated.

The support, both administrative and operational, fur-

(73) A-15; Personal Knowledge.

nished by 12th Army Group, served to make the PARIS operation a success when time for planning, training and equipping the Force was at a minimum. Headquarters 12th Army Group approved and made available, with a minimum of delay, all needed equipment, supplies and personnel possible. The use of the Counterintelligence Branch, G-2 Section, for target folder preparation was ideal as it was a permanent Branch with trained personnel well equipped to deal with intelligence targets. The numerous attachments from 12th Army Group served to strengthen the "T" Force organic staff in experience, training and specialized operating personnel. However, this showed that the organic staff needed to be enlarged so that complete dependence was not placed on attachments for some of the more responsible functions of the Force operation.

Combat troops which had been promised to the Force, prior to the entry into PARIS, were not made available until after the Force had entered the city and had dispatched Target Teams. The possible danger of losing trained intelligence specialists such as accompanied "T" Force into PARIS, without troop protection, cannot be over emphasized. "T" Force could have run into trouble north of LONGJUMEAU, or at any one of the German strong points along the route of march into PARIS. Also, combat troops were not available for indoctrination in "T" Force techniques, or to assist in planning for the orderly and systematic exploitation of the city.

"T" Force failed to locate the French 2d Armored Di-

vision at CHATEAUNEUF and without proper reconnaissance proceeded on, without protection, toward PARIS. This could have very well met with disaster had not the column stopped when it did and returned to RAMBOUILLET to locate the French Division Headquarters.

Important target data in Target Folders was received by the Force at almost the last moment. This was unavoidable due to conditions previously mentioned. However, receipt of this material even a few hours earlier would have permitted proper spotting of targets on the PARIS town plans which were used by Target Teams in attacking targets.

Some intelligence specialists joined the Force without having had any instructions as to their specific missions. Others who should have been with the Force failed to catch up until much later. Again, it can be said that the haste in organizing "T" Force and its rapid movement onto its first target resulted in some unavoidable confusion.

When the march was made on PARIS, it would have been highly advantageous to have organized Target Teams into team formations insofar as the shortage of vehicles would have permitted. This would have helped avoid the delay in organization which occurred at the command post upon arrival of the Force.

Radio communication with LONDON and 12th Army Group, throughout the operation, was furnished by the Office of Strategic Services, Special Counterintelligence detachment. This detachment also supplied expert personnel and in some cases, leadership, to the arrondissement Target Teams.

While the experience gained with these Target Teams was of value to the members of the detachment, the work was frequently not of a counterespionage nature and consequently a diversion from the true mission of special counterintelligence. Furthermore, had this detachment received orders to move to another location, "T" Force would have been without radio communication as well as some expert Target Team personnel. The communication problem encountered during this operation was simple as the PARIS telephone system was in operation, thereby insuring "T" Force Headquarters communications with the Target Teams.

On several occasions it was vital to send material and individuals to 12th Army Group and SHAEF by the most expeditious means when motor transportation required too long. In such cases, delays were experienced in securing the necessary air transportation.

Procedures and forms were evolved but a written SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) was not prepared, due to the speed of the operation. The detailed SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) which was prepared at the close of the operation would have saved untold hours of labor, confusion and would definitely have simplified the operation.

The importance of a smooth operating Reception Center was essential. This was a buffer between the public and the commander, staff and attached intelligence agencies. The "T" Force headquarters operated at maximum capacity during the first few days. The commander and his staff were relieved of many interruptions, which would have occurred had

not this Reception Center been operating.

Class I and III Supply created a problem. The large number of unannounced attachments and requests for supplies from transients added to the supply burden. Strict supervision finally curtailed, to a large extent, the furnishing of supplies to unauthorized agencies.

The functions of the S-3 Operations Section with respect to the Target Teams, and the functions of the S-2 Target Section were so closely allied that the establishment of an S-2/S-3 Operations Room was found desirable. This room contained the S-2 Target Section and a representative of the S-3 Operations Section who maintained operational control over the Target Teams.

The S-2 Information Section was valuable for keeping the Commander and his staff and the representatives of intelligence agencies briefed on the progress of the operation. This Section also furnished information on intelligence and targets that were available for exploitation. As a result of this it served as a buffer between the representatives of the intelligence agencies and the staff on intelligence matters.

The quantity of documents collected was colossal. The operation definitely showed that adequate provisions for the processing of large numbers of documents was essential. Furthermore, that the Documents Section and the Target Teams needed reinforcements of personnel trained in handling captured documents.

The matter of designating operational priority of tar-

gets is important. Agencies presenting targets were inclined to designate a high priority from their point of view, that would not necessarily receive the same operational priority by "F" Force. The question of priorities for Building Targets was a problem. Some of the Building targets, which were not given a high priority, were found to be occupied by French or American forces when they were eventually attacked by the Target Teams. In practically every instance, valuable documents and material had been thrown out or destroyed. Had these buildings been given a high priority, they would have been attacked and exploited prior to their occupation by French or American forces.

During the early part of the Operation, it was found that personnel of many intelligence agencies were operating on their own, using "F" Force only as a supply base. This defeated the purpose of "F" Force control, whereby all agencies would have available for examination all material uncovered by the entire Force. This was corrected by having one member of each intelligence agency check in each day with the S-2 Information Section. Thereby, a closer check was maintained on their activities and they were available to be given information on targets requiring their particular kind of exploitation.

Target Teams generally were composed of the same type of personnel for operation in an assigned area. It is believed that had Target Teams been made up of personnel required for the exploitation of a certain type of target, a more economical use of personnel would have been made. As

it was, the problem of briefing was not simple and many specialized personnel were dissipated.

Operational control over Target Teams during the early phases of the operation was difficult to maintain. To correct this, it was found necessary to have the Target Team Commanders or their representatives report in person daily to the Force Headquarters in order to maintain the necessary operational control. Matters dealing with the attack of targets, assignment of new targets, and reports were thereby easily adjusted. This applied equally as well to specialists and agencies operating in the capacity of Special Target Teams.

Completeness and rapidity of submission of team reports was not always the best. In many cases, the procedure of preparing and submitting reports hampered the team in its exploitation of targets.

There was not sufficient personnel to properly guard all the Building targets. This was due to an inadequate number of combat troops being attached to "T" Force to aid in carrying out its mission.

At the beginning of the operation, the Civilian Detention Center was set up in Petit Palais in which huge building the Force command post was located. This was found to be a mistake. Word got out that people were being detained here and it resulted in constant inquiries and visits regarding prisoners. As a result of this, as well as the eventual congestion, the Center was moved to a location where it was surrounded by a high wall and its activities were conducted with more secrecy.

In some instances, information was divulged as to the "T" Force mission to persons not requiring this knowledge. This resulted in occasional embarrassment to the Force when some arrests were made that were tracked down to "T" Force. Rumors spread rapidly among the French that any missing person could be located in the "T" Force Civilian Detention Center. Mention of the "T" Force Mission or its activities might well have jeopardized the success of the PARIS mission or future "T" Force missions.

To sum up the results of this operation, it can be said that:

1. The "T" Force Operation PARIS was without question, a success.
2. The Force was organized hastily and advance planning was at a minimum but yet the Force carried out its mission in an excellent manner.
3. The Operation proceeded rapidly to its successful conclusion with reasonable efficiency due entirely to the intelligent and hearty cooperation of all concerned.
4. Many mistakes were made in organizational and operational details which were corrected as necessary to permit greater efficiency and ease of operation. The staff was flexible.
5. Based on this operation, the first of its kind in the 12th Army Group area, subsequent operations had a pattern to follow which used in conjunction with lessons learned, resulted in more efficient and rapid exploitation of target cities.

LESSONS

Some of the lessons learned which were applied to subsequent "T" Force Operations:

1. Rarely will there ever be sufficient time to complete all plans for an operation. Plans must be flexible and the staff must be able to plan and organize while moving to a target.
2. High level support, both administrative and operational, is a necessity for prompt and successful "T" Force operations.
3. Complete Target Folders should be prepared by trained intelligence personnel, outside of "T" Force, and delivered to the Force in sufficient time to assign and post targets.
4. A "T" Force should have combat troops attached at least 48 hours prior to entry into a target city, for training and Force protection.
5. ^{Task Force} The organic staff must be large enough to carry on the continuity of certain vital operations without depending on attachments.
6. The "T" Force Commander should know what technical teams and individual specialists to expect and their specific interests so that Target Teams can be organized in advance.
7. All specialists, prior to joining "T" Force should be thoroughly briefed as to their mission and on how to reach the Force, thereby avoiding confusion and delay.

8. Target Teams, in order to avoid delay in attacking their targets, must be organized and mounted by teams so that they can attack from the march column.

9. It is essential that sufficient radio communications facilities be made organic to the Force to insure communication with higher and adjacent headquarters as well as with its Target Teams.

10. Air transport should be available on call to transport important personalities, documents and material to rear areas where more effective exploitation can be carried out.

11. A Standing Operating Procedure covering details of organization and administrative and operational procedures will save time, help avoid confusion and trial and error methods of operation.

12. A Reception Center to act as a buffer between the public and the Commander and his staff is essential to the smooth running of the headquarters.

13. Supply discipline must be enforced and only authorized units and agencies should be allowed to draw Class I and III supplies and be permitted mess facilities.

14. Many functions of S-2 and S-3 are so closely allied that joint operation and control, such as a joint S-2/S-3 Operations Room, is necessary.

15. Proper exploitation of documents requires the initial cataloguing and handling of documents by trained personnel.

16. Building targets must be given a high priority for attack before troops take them over for headquarters or

billets and thus destroy intelligence documents and equipment.

17. Close control must be exercised daily over attached intelligence agencies. This is necessary to insure that information picked up by them is available to all agencies, and that they are kept abreast of all targets requiring their special type of exploitation.

18. Target Team Commanders or their representatives must be in daily personal contact with the Force Headquarters to insure operational and administrative control.

19. Reports and their submission must be such as to relieve Target Teams of unnecessary clerical duties.

20. The number of attached combat troops should be sufficient to properly guard the Building targets initially assigned.

21. The Civilian Detention Center should to all outward appearances, have no connection with "T" Force and it should be operated with the utmost secrecy.

22. Mention of the existence of a "T" Force and discussion of its activities outside official circles, even after it has closed an operation, may well jeopardize the success of any future operations.